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Introduction
From the inception of the Zionist movement, as the nineteenth century came
to a close, Jewish families in Eastern Europe split. Some thought that only return
to the Jewish homeland could resolve the plight of Jews in exile; others held that
mass migration to Western countries, particularly the United States, would be
the more realistic means to a good and meaningful life.1 This difference of opinion soon translated into a tension of cultures and values. For the first half of the
twentieth century, even as the Zionist movement cultivated American Jews in
an effort to encourage US support for a Jewish state, many of its leaders rejected
any lessons they could draw from the American experience, let alone American
law. In their minds, America stood for unfettered capitalism and rugged individualism, values diametrically opposed to their dedication to building a utopia
in the holy land, based upon social justice and collective solidarity. As the discussion below reveals, Israelis have come to appreciate what America has to
I wish to thank Alon Harel, Moshe Negbi, and Zvi Triger for making valuable comments on this
piece, and Carolyn Mattus, Yulia Shilovitsky, and Avi Robinson for research assistance. All errors
are mine alone.
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offer in more than one way. American legal values and choices increasingly
gained influence and prestige.
The legal system of Palestine inherited by the British Mandate in 1922, and
left mostly in place when Israel declared independence in 1948, was shaped
by Ottoman law and British colonialism. Therefore, it was quite untouched by
American influences.2 Even today the basic Israeli legal structure and the content
of its norms is largely rooted in either British colonial legislation (e.g., the penal
code, the law of corporations, the law of evidence, tort law) or European influences, which is the heritage of the Europe-oriented Israeli legal elite (e.g., the
law of contracts, the law of sales). In matters of constitutional design, the most
glaring difference between the United States and Israel is the continuing Israeli
resistance to a comprehensive written constitution. Ever since they achieved
independence, Israelis have been discussing the need for a constitution. Each
decade has seen its own set of proposals for a preferred version, but so far none
has been adopted. Instead, Israel went to West Germany to borrow the term
“basic law” while giving it a unique Israeli content. Rather than passing one
comprehensive basic law, as the Germans have done, Israelis opted for a series
of statutes they called basic laws, which were adopted over time. Thus, Basic
Law: the Knesset, Basic Law: the Government, Basic Law: the Courts, and in
the 1990s, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom came into being.3 From the
perspective of constitutional design, these basic laws reflect a system radically
different from that of the United States.
To begin with, these laws are not firmly entrenched.4 The Knesset may amend
most of their provisions with a simple majority. This makes them radically different from the US Constitution, where the amendment process is cumbersome
and demanding. Additionally, there are several differences rooted in the form
of governance. For example, in the US the president is elected for four years
and, barring impeachment, is not dependent on the approval of Congress. In
Israel, the principle of separation of powers is flexible, with the cabinet staying
in power at the pleasure of the Knesset. Furthermore, the cabinet reflects a coalition: the variety of parties representing a majority of the 120 Knesset members.
Fundamental disagreements between the coalition partners affect the range of
policy choices open to the prime minister.
Similarly, there are several differences between the Israeli court system and
the American judicial branch. The jury is not and has never been a part of the
Israeli judicial system. Judges are appointed by a committee that includes members of the judiciary, the bar, the Knesset, and the cabinet. The Supreme Court
of Israel operates as both an appellate high court and a “high court of justice.”
The latter is an institution introduced by the British Mandate but has since acquired a distinctly Israeli flavor. It allows ordinary citizens to challenge governmental action directly to the highest court without first going through the lower
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courts. Israelis are fond of this mechanism and make extensive use of it.5 The
courts, as we shall see below, have come increasingly to consult American precedents as they contemplate the legal problems before them.
This brings us to Israeli legal education. As I have argued previously, legal
education in Israel has seen a substantial transformation. In the 1950s it was
largely based on European models with strong English overtones. Today an
American student visiting one of the elite Israeli schools will find himself or
herself quite at home. Israeli law professors are very familiar with American law
and make extensive use of it. Their students, then, are not treading terra incognita
as they visit an American legal institution or read American legal scholarship.
Similarly, Israeli law firms, particularly the big ones engaged in international
business, have adopted the model of the American law firm and emulate its
structure and patterns.6 Again, an American lawyer visiting one of these firms
may find the environment quite familiar, and vice versa.
It appears, therefore, that one may confidently trace a historical pattern. Following its establishment, Israel’s legal system bore very little resemblance to
the American legal system. Over the decades, as Israel has forged a bond with
the United States, partially due to political realignments and partially because
of the universal process of globalization, American influence became more welcome and accepted. Today, just as one sees everywhere in Israel the fingerprints
of American politics and culture, so may one detect the fingerprints of American
law. A caveat, however, is in order: both American law and Israeli law are complex systems, coats of many colors. One should beware of overly broad generalizations. One should be mindful of the complexity and not assume too much
coherence in the flow of influence from one side of the ocean to the other.
This essay addresses one area where the American influence on Israeli law
has been quite evident: freedom of expression. The First Amendment to the US
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press.” This language invites speculation: what does “no law”
mean? How should “abridge” be interpreted? How much should be included in
the word “speech”? Throughout the nineteenth century, the First Amendment
was not interpreted to protect much expression.7 After the First World War,
however, the US Supreme Court developed a robust jurisprudence elaborating
both a theoretical base and a set of doctrines designed to protect an expansive
array of speech rights. This jurisprudence was also held to apply to the several
states.8 In the twenty-first century no one doubts the significance of free speech
as a core American constitutional value deserving and begetting zealous judicial protection.9
Five years after it was established, Israel’s Supreme Court adopted this American legacy as its own. The transplantation was neither mechanical nor utterly
successful. Still, it did take root and has been developed in ways that echoed
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developments in the United States. Today there is little doubt about the Israeli
legal commitment to freedom of expression. I shall trace the American influence
through representative cases in each of the six decades of Israel’s life as a sovereign state.10

Copyright © 2012. Westview Press. All rights reserved.

The 1950s: Kol Ha’am v. Minister of the Interior
Imagine a legal system where the press is regulated by a special statute that requires each newspaper to obtain a license prior to publication. Further, imagine
that a public official (the minister of the interior, in Israel’s case) is vested with
the power to suspend the license and close down the newspaper if he determines
that the newspaper was publishing materials that may cause a breach of the
peace. In other words, the law gives the minister unbridled discretion. Imagine,
too, that the polity has just emerged from a bloody war, is surrounded by enemies, and is facing a world skeptical of its right or strength to exist. Imagine
that the state is anxious to find allies and supporters, but attracts none, that it
yearns for unity and solidarity and feels that controversy and contentiousness are
harmful. If such a legal system has no written constitution and a five-year-old
hesitant and restrained Supreme Court, how would importing American jurisprudence of free speech be possible?
Simon Agranat, the Israeli Justice who authored the opinion in Kol Ha’am v.
Minister of Interior, offered the answer.11 Agranat was born in Louisville, Kentucky, and grew up in Chicago, Illinois. He attended the University of Chicago
both as an undergraduate (majoring in history) and as a law student. An avid
Zionist, he immigrated to Palestine in 1929, shortly after obtaining his law degree. Agranat’s fervent Zionism did not prevent him from deeply loving and
appreciating what the United States had to offer. These qualities helped him
when he came to write the opinion in this seminal case, which all agree has laid
the solid foundations of Israeli administrative and constitutional law, moving
Israel’s legal system away from colonial authoritarianism and toward democratic liberalism.
The newspaper Kol Ha’am (The People’s Voice) belonged to the Israeli Communist Party and promoted the party’s platform. On January 14, 1953, it published an editorial alleging that Israel had offered to send 200,000 troops to
support the American effort in the war against North Korea. The specific allegation was false, but it was true that Israel’s government at that time was in the
process of abandoning its “neutral” or “independent” position in matters of foreign affairs and beginning to support the United States. From the vantage point
of the twenty-first century, these facts seem trivial. But one should be careful
not to fall into the trap of ahistoricism. In the early 1950s, Israel had a robust
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left-wing political camp composed of several influential parties. The Cold War
was raging and these parties tended to side with the Soviet Union. Israel’s government and its left-leaning ruling party, Mapai, wished to maintain a neutral
stance, both to secure the support of its left wing and out of concern for the
large Jewish population behind the Iron Curtain. Thus, although Israel was beginning to seek American friendship and support, it was not yet willing to openly
declare allegiance to American leadership. Into this complex web came the Kol
Ha’am editorial, both criticizing vehemently and blowing out of proportion
David Ben-Gurion’s overtures toward the United States. Ben-Gurion was so
vexed that he found it necessary and appropriate to deny the allegations from
the podium of the Knesset. That step would be equivalent to the US president
holding a press conference to deny certain news reports—a step indicating how
seriously the need for denial was taken. In addition, the minister of the interior
also decided to invoke the law and suspend the newspaper. When Kol Ha’am
petitioned the Supreme Court, it was asking the Court to step into a rather hot
political crisis. To aggravate matters for the Supreme Court, a three-month-old
precedent, from the pen of the chief justice, held that the press ordinance gave
the minister of the interior absolute discretion and that therefore there was no
room for judicial intervention.12
In a unanimous opinion by a panel of three justices, Agranat ignored the
precedent and invalidated the suspension order. The legal stepping stones he
used were declaring that Israel was committed to the value of free expression,
and elaborating on the theories that justify the need for this freedom in a democracy. The principle of free expression, he said, is particularly robust in the
area of censorship or prior restraint. Therefore, the broad discretion vested in
the minister of the interior, inherited from the British Mandate, must be judicially structured to balance between this pillar of democratic theory and the
perceived need to protect valid interests such as the prevention of breach of
the peace or national security. The formula for the appropriate balance, he held,
was the probable danger test. Three elements testify to the heavy influence of
American law on this opinion. First, the Supreme Court relied on the opinions
of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis for the development of
the foundations of the justifications for freedom of expression. Second, the Supreme Court relied on what was at the time the most recent American rendition
of the clear and present danger test, found in Dennis v. United States.13 The
Dennis formula taught that if the government wished to suppress political expression, it had to show that “the gravity of the evil” sought to be averted (e.g.,
the overthrow of the government with force and violence) “discounted by the
improbability that it might occur” was such as to allow official suppression.14
Agranat similarly called for an assessment of the “probability” that the danger
might indeed occur. This in fact has been the test Israeli courts have applied in
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matters of free expression to this day.15 Third, and most important for the development of Israeli constitutionalism, Agranat located the principle of free
speech in Israel’s Declaration of Independence.16 The Declaration, he said, may
not be a part of the positive law, but it is the fountain from which all legitimacy
flows. It possesses enormous persuasive power. This last move was also peculiarly American, but somewhat more subtle than the previous two. In endowing
the Declaration of Independence with interpretive inspiration, Agranat was actually (but not explicitly) relying on the man he held in profound admiration:
American Civil War president Abraham Lincoln. In his Gettysburg Address,
Lincoln invoked the great legacy of the United States as a nation “conceived in
liberty,” spoke of the “new birth of freedom,” and tied this freedom to democratic
values by stating that it was a government of, by, and for the people. Agranat
planted these ideas on Israeli soil. The Zionist dream to establish a Jewish state
was precisely a dream for “new birth of freedom.” Israel was a nation “conceived
in liberty,” and as such it was dedicated to democratic values. It was an audacious
move, quite stunning in the Israeli climate of the 1950s, a move that could not
have been imagined by one not immersed in American history and culture. The
bold assertion that the purpose of the polity was liberty, and that liberty meant
a democratic regime demanding a large measure of free expression, was very
American and, in the early 1950s, not widely accepted outside of America’s borders. Agranat was confident that Israelis, too, were eager to lift the stone off the
well of freedom and to drink the fresh water of liberty.
It is important to emphasize that the importation of American law did not
amount to mindless imitation. The best proof lies in the result itself. In the
United States of the early 1950s, McCarthyism was roaring, and anybody suspected of harboring sympathy toward communist ideology was labeled disloyal.
In Dennis v. United States, the case invoked by Agranat in Kol Ha’am, the US
Supreme Court sustained the conviction of the Communist Party leadership.
Agranat refused to let the ugly demons of McCarthyism fly over Israeli soil. He
indeed adopted the Dennis legal formula but applied it to protect communist
speech. Kol Ha’am was allowed to continue its raucous criticism of the government with impunity. A few years later the Israeli Communist Party died a natural
death, and its mouthpiece, Kol Ha’am, faded into oblivion.

1960s: Yeredor v. Central Elections Committee, 1965
The case of Kol Ha’am depicted the cleavages of political opinion among the political majority of Jews in Israel, communists included, but Yeredor went to the
heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.17 As a result of the bloody war that followed
Israel’s Declaration of Independence, Israeli Arabs found themselves demoted
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from their status as a majority in the land to that of a minority. In the 1950s, a
small group of political activists formed El Ard (“the land” in Arabic), but the
group was outlawed by the government. In 1964, members of this group, together
with Jewish political activists, formed a political party called the Socialist List
and applied to run in the upcoming elections to the Knesset. The government
objected on the grounds that five members on the list were also members of
the outlawed organization El Ard, suspected of aiming to destroy the Jewish
state and restore the status quo ante. The Central Election Committee sided
with the government and banned the party.18 The question before the Supreme
Court was whether Israeli law permitted banning a political party, thereby violating the right to be elected, and by way of extension, whether the right to
elect a party of one’s choice was also negatively implicated.19
The dilemma the Supreme Court faced was that the statute regulating elections
did not vest the Central Elections Committee with authority to ban a party.
There was no explicit statutory language authorizing the ban. The government
was asking the Supreme Court to recognize that it had the inherent authority
to ban a political party, or in other words, to make a determination that
amounted to judicial legislation.
The Supreme Court, again through Justice Agranat, who by then was chief
justice, held that the Central Elections Committee did indeed possess the power
to ban a party.20 Among other arguments, Agranat relied again on Israel’s Declaration of Independence. This time, however, he did not tilt the balance in favor
of liberty. He invoked the part of the Declaration that asserted that Israel was
a Jewish state and had it trump the freedom of expression. The identity of the
Israeli polity, Agranat declared for the first time in a judicial opinion, consisted
of a fusion of both Jewish and democratic elements. One could not purge any
parts of this formula. No party in the Knesset, he held, could doubt Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state or advocate its extinction. Because the Supreme Court
agreed with the Central Elections Committee that the applicant party intended
to deny the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state, it concluded that the party
could be banned.
This form of legal argument exposes a fundamental difference between Israel
and the United States. Indeed, the method of mining the fundamental principles
underlying the system was the same—like Abraham Lincoln before him, Agranat
invoked the Declaration of Independence to justify his holding. But whereas in
the case of Kol Ha’am Agranat pointed to a principle that Israel shared with the
United States, the principle of democracy, in Yeredor he allowed a very different
principle to take center stage: that Israel is a Jewish state. In American law, one
does not find such a substantive ethnic attribute of the American polity that is
strong enough to override the democratic process. By contrast, Israel is a country
always struggling to balance between the universal and the particular, between
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its commitment to democracy and its determination to remain a Jewish state.
In Yeredor the Supreme Court allowed the particular to trump the universal
and excluded the Socialist List from the electoral process.
Still, President Lincoln entered the deliberations of the Yeredor case as well.
During the American Civil War Lincoln justified the emergency suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus without congressional approval, in direct violation
of the Suspension Clause found in Article I of the Constitution, as follows: “It
forces us to ask: ‘Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness?
Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people,
or too weak to maintain its own existence?’”21 In other words, Lincoln argued
that the safety of the republic justified the temporary suspension of the writ.
Here, too, Agranat was implying, violating the equal-protection principle inherent in the election law was justified to protect the Jewish state. In 1985 the
Knesset amended the election law to allow the Central Election Commission
to ban parties.22
It is important to note the differences between the reliance on American law
in Kol Ha’am and in Yeredor. In Kol Ha’am Agranat used Lincoln’s appeal to the
Declaration of Independence to incorporate the principle of free expression
into Israeli law. In Yeredor, Agranat used Lincoln’s unilateral arrogation of emergency powers to the executive branch to justify the power of the Central Elections Committee to ban political parties. Thus, whereas Kol Ha’am aligned itself
with the more sunny disposition of American constitutionalism, Yeredor opted
for the authoritarian, suppressive potential inherent in American constitutional
interpretation. Both tracks, indeed, are available for importation. Both American
and Israeli laws are complex enough systems to permit such choices.23

The 1970s: The Yom Kippur War
and the Law of Defamation
Two years after Yeredor was decided, Israel experienced one of the most traumatic events in its nineteen-year history, an event that came to define its identity
to this day. The Six-Day War in June 1967, preceding a most terrifying “waiting
period,” ended with a glorious victory. Israel emerged as a dominant military
power in the Middle East and created the now-intractable dilemma concerning
the future of the occupied territories. Under the leadership of Prime Minister
Golda Meir, born in Russia but raised in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, US-Israeli
relations became cozy. American influence on Israeli politics, culture, and
economy was increasingly evident. And yet, while Israelis were basking in the
splendor of their military prowess and economic prosperity, they failed to foresee the gathering storm. The 1973 Yom Kippur War, a surprise attack launched
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simultaneously by Egypt and Syria, inflicted severe harm on Israel, tore the
people’s confidence to pieces, and exposed the country’s imminent vulnerability.
It also exposed an arrogant and conceited leadership, blind to the writing on
the wall. Following intense public pressure, a commission of inquiry was appointed, headed by Chief Justice Simon Agranat, to investigate the causes for
“the mishap.” At the same time, the United States itself experienced an unparalleled political crisis. Shattered by the failed war in Vietnam and the revelations
of massive governmental deceit to keep the war going, Americans were facing
the Watergate scandal and President Richard Nixon’s disgraceful fall from
power. The crown of glory went to the press, which heroically exposed government misconduct and insisted on official accountability. By contrast, the
Israeli press at that time was rather smug and complacent. Indeed, Kol Ha’am
protected freedom of the press, but Israeli press culture did not take bold advantage of that freedom. Publishers and journalists saw themselves as the long
arm of the government and felt comfortable adhering to its strategy and guidelines. Any doubtful voice was silenced by the military censor, acting under the
Defense (Emergency) Regulations, which were also inherited from the British
Mandate.24 Expectations of unity and solidarity shaped the popular understanding of democracy, and aggressive watchdogs were not welcome. After
the Yom Kippur War, this self-image began to change. The press observed the
American Fourth Estate’s vigorous challenges and felt remorseful and inadequate. Israelis were angry with their government, and journalists translated
their anger into an increasing willingness to raise serious questions about government policy. When the Agranat Commission began probing the political
and military performance that led to the Yom Kippur War, the media coverage
became hypercritical and aggressive.25 The members of the commission, among
them Justices Agranat and Moshe Landau, were not accustomed to this level
of aggressive, even acrimonious criticism. As a result, they felt it was only natural to appeal to the minister of justice and to the attorney general to protect
them from this watchdog that had suddenly been turned loose. They expected
the attorney general to muzzle the press. Herein we see the tensions inside Israeli law related to various paths open to the decision makers. The attorney
general could choose the conventional path that Israel had inherited from the
British Mandate. This path empowered the government to invoke the law of
contempt of court and either punish reporters who “crossed the line” or at least
issue a warning that might chill their enthusiasm for criticizing aggressively.
The other path was to follow the American model and limit the power of contempt of court because of “the profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”26
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Much to the disappointment of the Agranat Commission, Attorney General
Meir Shamgar preferred the American to the English solution. Shamgar’s decision to tolerate hostile press coverage inaugurated a new era in the relationship
between the government and the press in Israel that was closer to the American
model. Israel’s press is still rather protective of its government and tends to be
deferential in matters of national security, but it is now more self-conscious of
its professional duty to keep a critical eye on governmental affairs.27
From the perspective of the history of Israel’s Supreme Court, the 1970s signaled the end of one era and the beginning of another. Agranat and several of
his brethren retired. New justices were appointed, who were either born in or
had grown up in Israel, but who eyed the American system of government and
its legal culture with appreciation and affection. Shamgar, the attorney general
who valued the freedom of the press, joined the Supreme Court and in 1983
would be appointed chief justice. Meanwhile, Yitzhak Rabin, architect of the
victory in the Six-Day War and an admirer of the American constitutional system, particularly the strong powers vested in the president, was now prime minister. Rabin’s new attorney general, Aharon Barak, the outstanding former dean
of the faculty of law at Hebrew University who had spent time at Harvard Law
School, would also soon join the Israeli Supreme Court. Barak would succeed
Shamgar as chief justice in 1995. These two men are pivotal to the continuation
of our story because of their determination to pursue the path Justice Agranat
took in 1953 and further consult American jurisprudence, particularly that related to freedom of expression.28
Back to freedom of expression in Israel of the 1970s. As a junior justice in
the mid-1970s, Shamgar attempted to modify the Israeli law of defamation by
incorporating into it the important 1964 holding in New York Times v. Sullivan.29
In that case, a unanimous US Supreme Court held that when public officials
sue the press for defamation, the First Amendment operates as a shield to protect
the journalist. To succeed in a defamation claim, the public official must prove
that the journalist had actual knowledge that the report was false or exercised
reckless disregard of the falsehood (the doctrine known as the “actual malice”
rule). This holding has been recognized as one of the cornerstones of First
Amendment law in the United States and has survived both the conservative
Burger and Rehnquist courts.30
The Israeli case Ha’aretz v. Electric Company involved the CEO of a governmental company.31 The director was criticized for authorizing the electric company to purchase for him an expensive American car with fancy amenities. The
purchase occurred during a time of economic recession in Israel. Following
public outcry, the director announced that he would sell the car, but he appeared
to take his time. The newspaper Ha’aretz criticized this state of affairs, and the
electric company sued, claiming that the director’s reputation was injured. In

Israel and the United States : Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations, edited by Robert O Freedman, Westview Press, 2012.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bu/detail.action?docID=866693.
Created from bu on 2017-12-05 06:24:34.

9780813344942-text_Freedman 1/17/12 9:48 AM Page 197

Copyright © 2012. Westview Press. All rights reserved.

Chapter 9: American Influence on Israeli Law

197

court, Shamgar interpreted the Israeli defamation law in light of New York Times
v. Sullivan; he even provided the same justifications that Justice William Brennan
provided in his American opinion. Justice Shamgar’s opinion prevailed in the
first round, but Israel’s court then decided to invoke a procedure called “further
hearing,” which allowed reconsideration of a ruling with an expanded panel of
justices. Five justices now reconsidered the case, and Shamgar found himself
dissenting. Writing for the majority, Justice Landau, then deputy chief justice
and soon to be chief justice, held that the Israeli law of defamation was closer
to the British model than to the American model. Therefore, a firm distinction
between facts and opinion required that facts journalists reported must be correct. Only a “fair comment” or opinion was immune to a lawsuit by the public
official. The enlarged panel found Ha’aretz, the leading daily at the time, liable
for defamation. By historical accident, the matter came before the Israeli Supreme
Court as the Nazi Party in Illinois was litigating its right to march in the town
of Skokie. The town was populated by Holocaust survivors who strongly opposed
the idea that Nazis could be allowed to march in their streets. Both the state
and the federal courts refused to carve an exception to the principle that the
First Amendment insisted on content neutrality, and did not allow a municipality
to silence a view, no matter how reprehensible.32 Justice Landau was shocked.
As he rejected Shamgar’s view and held that Ha’aretz had defamed the director
of the electric company and owed him compensation for injuring his reputation,
Landau added, “[Skokie] was decided because the Justices saw themselves bound
by the First Amendment. We should better reflect on that phenomenon.”33
The Landau-Shamgar debate brought to the surface the ever-present tension
within the Israeli legal community. One camp, represented by Landau, preferred
a cautious path loyal to the English common law, which values order and civility
over social dynamism, and therefore would opt for a more restrained public debate.
The other camp, represented by Shamgar, wished to encourage Israeli development into a vibrant, energetic democracy, willing to risk some cacophony to allow a wider spectrum of views and ideas and encourage accountability and
transparency. We shall return to this point below.

The 1980s: Kahane Comes to Israel
The 1980s intensified the tension between the two camps. An American-born
rabbi named Meir Kahane forced the Israeli polity to make a choice in at least
one area: racist speech.34 Kahane was a relatively well known figure in New York
Jewish circles. He founded the Jewish Defense League, an organization prone
to violence, feeding on the tension between Jews and African Americans at the
end of the 1960s. He also attracted public attention through his fight on behalf
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of Soviet Jewry. In 1971, Kahane immigrated to Israel, settled in the occupied
territories, and became politically active. His agenda included a racist component: he advocated an Israel populated by Jews alone, considered Israeli Palestinians as “others,” and encouraged ethnic discord. Although Jewish-Israeli
prejudice against Palestinian Arabs was a part of Israeli society prior to Kahane’s
arrival in Israel, his charismatic presence and daring tactics considerably aggravated Jewish-Arab relations. The 1980s saw several legal battles concerning
the legitimacy of racist speech in Israel, mostly related to Kahane and his followers. By and large, the courts favored wider latitude for free speech, whereas
the Knesset and other government institutions favored curbing racist speech.
In 1985, the Knesset amended Section 7 of Basic Law: the Knesset, to ban political parties that incite racism.35 Another amendment to the Knesset’s procedure
prohibited submission of a bill that contained racist language.36 In 1986, racist
speech became a criminal offense punishable by a five-year prison term.37 Israel’s
Knesset preferred to follow the example of Europe and the United Kingdom,
jurisdictions that banned racist speech, rather than that of the United States.38
Comparing the Israeli activity in this area to that obtaining in the United
States allows us to assess the extent and the limits of American influence on Israeli law. Today racist speech, as distinguished from hate crimes, is largely protected under the First Amendment.39 That has not always been so. In 1952, the
US Supreme Court held that a state acts within its police powers when it bans
racist speech.40 Thereafter, the Court expanded the protection of speech, even
to racist speech, but at the same time expanded civil rights.41 Consequently, for
a while Americans thought the civil rights movement had won and racism was
a thing of the past.42 During the 1980s some legal scholars began to argue that
“words wound” and that therefore regulating racist speech should be
permissible.43 This debate was taking place at precisely the same time the Israelis
were deliberating this question. The Israeli Supreme Court, in several opinions
involving Kahane, ruled that freedom of expression should prevail. As we saw,
however, the Knesset was of a different opinion.44 We see a fundamental difference between the US and the Israeli constitutional systems. In Israel, as in the
United States, the Supreme Court has great power to interpret statutes and influence the legal culture. However, the Israeli Knesset does have the final say. If
the members of the Knesset form a majority, their votes prevail and their legislative judgment overrides that of the Supreme Court. Not so in the United
States. In both Israel and the United States, racism is a fact of life and has been
found to be toxic. Both polities attempted to curb it through the law. The movement to outlaw racist speech succeeded in Israel but failed in the United States,
where neither Congress nor state legislatures may trump the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution.45 Only a constitutional amendment, which
is achieved through a difficult and rarely successful process, may do so.
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But if in the matter of regulating racist speech Israel deliberately chose a
different path and criminalized racist expression, in the matter of censorship it
exhibited a more marked willingness to adopt US ideas. Two important cases
of the 1980s display this point.
Yitzhak Laor is a noted Israeli poet and writer. In the early 1980s he wrote a
play titled Ephraim Goes to the Army. The play scratched an open wound: the
performance of Israeli soldiers in the occupied territories. In sharp and poignant
dialogue, the play denounced Israeli brutality against the Palestinians.46 The
Film and Theater Censorship Board, a relic of the mandatory period, was outraged by the play and banned its production. The 1984 opinion in Laor v. Film
and Theater Censorship Board overturned the ban and has become a landmark
case.47 Interestingly, the Censorship Board internalized the Kol Ha’am test and
argued that the “probable danger” doctrine, rather than the bad tendency test
or some “reasonable” yardstick, was the appropriate legal tool by which to evaluate the ban. The board found depicting Israelis as brutal occupiers, even resembling Nazis, both inflicted immeasurable pain on the Jewish population and
created a probable danger that Palestinian Israelis would resort to violence.
Again, the reader may ask herself if the social, political, and historical differences
between the United States and Israel warranted a different judicial approach.
Was it relevant that the US population did not suffer the emotional proximity
to the trauma of the Holocaust that Israelis experienced? Or that Americans
are not familiar with a domestic occupation and, furthermore, since 1971 American males have not been obliged to perform military service? Still, Americans
have experienced the trauma of slavery, of Jim Crow laws, and of extensive
lynching and yet remained loyal to the principle of free expression. The Israeli
Supreme Court must have felt that the American principles, rooted in the theory
of democratic self-government, should serve Israel as well. The Supreme Court
made several references to American law, quoted both American scholars and
judicial opinions, and emphasized three important American constitutional
doctrines. First, the Supreme Court emphasized the need to apply a balancing
of interests test that would be structured so that the value of free speech would be
appropriately assessed. Second, the Supreme Court emphasized that it would
review the facts de novo rather than defer to the judgment of the Censorship
Board when free expression was at stake. Third, the Supreme Court made use
of the means/ends relationship prong of the strict scrutiny test, often applied
by US courts when a constitutional right is allegedly violated. The Supreme
Court held that if a less drastic means was available to the decision makers, they
should not resort to censorship. None of these devices was new to Israeli law.
The innovation lay in the subordination of the Film and Theater Censorship
Board to the jurisprudence of free expression and in the factual context. The
future of the occupied territories has been an increasingly contentious question
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in Israel. Israelis wished to think of the government in the West Bank as “enlightened occupation,” and the play meant to specifically puncture this belief.
The Supreme Court’s opinion, therefore, touched a raw nerve, but evidently the
justices felt that Israelis were mature enough to overcome the indignation and
permit a climate of free expression. The Knesset eventually abolished the Censorship Board related to theatrical plays. Today only film censorship survives.
We shall return to this issue when we address cases of the twenty-first century. 48
A 1988 case seals the trilogy for this decade. Laor presented the army in a
very unfavorable light. But even though the play walked a fine line between fact
and fiction, it was still theater, and portrayed low-level officers. The case resulted
in limitations on the board, an archaic body about which Israelis did not care
much. Shnitzer v. the Military Censor was an altogether different matter.49 It involved an institution at the heart of the security establishment: the mythical
Mossad. It challenged the authority of the military censor, until then an authority
quite immune to popular scrutiny. An article by Aluf Ben, then a young, irreverent reporter and today Ha’aretz’s editor-in-chief, discussed recent dissatisfaction among the Mossad upper echelons, and situated the upcoming appointment
of a new Mossad chief in the context of this discontent. The article also wished
to name, and describe, the head of the Mossad, until then inaccessible to public
scrutiny, and only known by his first initial.50 In accordance with the law, the
article was submitted to the military censor, who repeatedly banned publication.
Ha’ir, a local magazine and a part of the Ha’aretz group slated to publish the
piece, petitioned the Supreme Court. The question was, To what extent was
the press entitled to tell the Israeli people the truth about one of their central
institutions? In a unanimous opinion of three justices, Chief Justice Barak held
that the military censor, like the rest of the executive branch, was subject to judicial review. The censor was obliged to apply the “probable danger test” before
he could censor journalists. In a review de novo, the Court examined the article
and decided that the probable danger test was not met and that therefore the
magazine was entitled to publish the piece. The Court relied heavily on the 1953
case of Kol Ha’am and other Israeli precedents. The landmark American case
involving the Pentagon Papers also made an appearance, and one has a feeling
that the Israeli Supreme Court was eager to adopt its spirit and approach.51 The
Pentagon Papers case rejected the Nixon administration’s request for an injunction against the Washington Post and the New York Times when the two newspapers began to publish top-secret documents related to the Vietnam War. The
case pushed the envelope in its insistence on accountability and transparency
in government and in allowing the people access to the belly of governmental
operations. The Israeli Supreme Court must have been proud of its bold move,
placing Israel squarely in the camp of vibrant Western democracies, eager to
nurture the principle that the ruled must keep watch over their rulers.
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The 1990s: Basic Law—Human Dignity and Freedom
and the Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin
We must now divert from our narrative to flag two important constitutional
events in the 1990s that are indirectly connected to freedom of expression: the
passage in 1992 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.
This law raises important questions: First, are the rights it recognizes more
privileged than those rights it fails to mention? Second, does the law confer
upon the courts the power to invalidate subsequent legislation that violated the
rights recognized therein? In other words, does the new Basic Law confer upon
the courts the power of judicial review?52
The Basic Law does not mention the right to freedom of expression or the
right to equal protection of the laws, which is an important subject that is not
addressed in this chapter. The original plan was to submit to the Knesset additional but separate Basic Laws that would guarantee freedom of speech and
freedom of association. In all probability this plan aimed to prevent the legislation from becoming contentious and to enhance the chance that the Knesset
would adopt a bill guaranteeing at least some rights.53 The lesson for the reader
is that to the extent that the Knesset looks to the United States for inspiration,
it picks and chooses from that legacy what it wishes to adopt. The US Bill of
Rights begins with the First Amendment. Israel’s Knesset kept its silence about
free speech, neither endorsing nor rejecting the right. This does mean that the
pull of American culture notwithstanding, Israelis are marching to their own
drummer. Some have suggested that the right to freedom of expression may be
“found” in the concept of human dignity, which is the cornerstone of Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Freedom. We shall return to this issue momentarily.
Another central question relates to judicial review. Did the Basic Law endow
the courts with the power to invalidate legislation?54 It was certainly silent on
this issue just as the US Constitution was silent when William Marbury sued
James Madison over the withholding of his commission to a judgeship. In Marbury v. Madison, now a cornerstone of American constitutional law, Chief Justice
John Marshall determined that the federal courts did possess the power to invalidate legislation if they concluded that it violated the constitution. No one
has doubted this proposition ever since.55 In 1992, Chief Justice Aharon Barak
gave a speech later published under the title “The Constitutional Revolution.”
He suggested that the Basic Law created a Bill of Rights and conferred upon the
courts the power of judicial review. Soon thereafter, in Bank Hamizrahi v. Migdal,
a panel of nine justices accepted Barak’s idea and held that Israeli courts could
invalidate legislation that violated the Basic Law.56 The fingerprints of Marbury
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v. Madison, as well as the two centuries of American debate, make a strong presence in this case. The terms “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint” entered
the Israeli legal menu, and any Israeli law student feels at ease discussing their
pros and cons.57
The other central event in the 1990s was the assassination of Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995, at a peace rally in Tel Aviv. The assassination of the prime minister, hero of the Six-Day War, and architect of the Oslo
peace process by a young man who hoped he would thereby undermine Rabin’s
policies was an earth-shattering event. It ignited a fierce debate about the contours of free speech in Israel and the distinction between protected expression
and incitement. In the aftermath of the assassination, the Israeli law of incitement
has been amended several times to reflect the Knesset’s fear that the principle
of free expression might be used by undemocratic or nationalist forces who do
not value the principles of democracy. The same debate was repeated during
the prime ministership of Ariel Sharon when plans for evacuating settlements
from the Gaza Strip were carried out. It is quite likely that we have not seen the
end of this debate and that the political turmoil accompanying any decision
about the future of the occupied territories will bring about renewed calls for a
vigorous application of the criminal law against incitement, countered by defenders of free speech.58
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom made an appearance in a highly
controversial case, symbolically concluding the twentieth century. It had to do
with the Holocaust, memory, history, and Zionist ideology. It also raised questions about postmodernism, the relativity of truth, and whether a sharp line
between fact and fiction must be preserved even at the expense of artistic freedom. Hannah Senesh has been a mythical figure in Israel and in the Jewish
world.59 A young woman, a budding poet, and a courageous soldier, she was
recruited by the British to parachute behind enemy lines in Hungary and make
contact with the remnants of the Jewish community then being transported by
Adolf Eichmann to the death camps. She was caught by the Gestapo, tortured,
and executed. In Israeli mythology she stands for noble heroism. Furthermore,
she is contrasted with Rudolf Kasztner, leader of the Jewish community in Hungary, who many suspected of collaborating with the Nazis.60 Motty Lerner, a
playwright, wrote a play about the Kasztner affair and included a statement by
Kasztner that Senesh broke under aggressive interrogation and gave away the
names of her fellow paratroopers. The question before the Supreme Court was
whether Senesh’s brother, Giora, had the right to enjoin Israel’s Broadcasting
Agency, which is a governmental institution, from including the statement in
the play. It should be emphasized that Lerner and the Broadcasting Agency attached an announcement that the play was a work of fiction, a docudrama. Giora
Senesh argued that even a fictional assault on his sister’s memory was intolerably

Israel and the United States : Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations, edited by Robert O Freedman, Westview Press, 2012.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bu/detail.action?docID=866693.
Created from bu on 2017-12-05 06:24:34.

9780813344942-text_Freedman 1/17/12 9:48 AM Page 203

Copyright © 2012. Westview Press. All rights reserved.

Chapter 9: American Influence on Israeli Law

203

painful and should not be permitted. In a 2–1 opinion, the Supreme Court declined to order the Broadcasting Agency to delete the damaging statement.61
The entire Supreme Court agreed that Senesh was not broken during the interrogation and did not divulge the names of her comrades. This proved to be
an important pillar of the opinion. The basic Zionist narrative was confirmed
by the Supreme Court. Because the Supreme Court expressed confidence in
Senesh’s heroism, it was free to pose her fight for freedom in Nazi-occupied
Europe as compatible with, rather than antithetical to, the freedom of expression
that her brother’s petition attacked. The Senesh Court, therefore, did not confirm
the stain on Senesh’s reputation, but rather augmented Senesh’s struggle to free
the world from tyranny, any tyranny. Barak’s first step was to anchor the right to
freedom of expression in Israeli law. Without analyzing the question, Barak assumed that the term “human dignity” in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom
included freedom of expression. He also enlisted canonical precedent (Kol Ha’am),
the deepest roots of Jewish culture (prophecy as a phenomenon of speaking truth
to power), and the dual nature of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.62 These
three fundamental arguments are all authentically Israeli and rather independent
of American influence. Together they prove the level of maturity and confidence
that the Israeli judiciary had reached at that point, skillfully using the tools in
the arsenal of the polity itself to resolve significant questions.
However, America was peeping behind the veil in subtle and less subtle ways.
The Kol Ha’am case itself, as discussed above, was based on considerable US intellectual sources. It is indeed interesting to see how it has now been detached
from its mooring in US law and culture and has attained an Israeli life of its own.
American legal influence was apparent as well. The Israeli Supreme Court quoted
Justice Brennan’s famous statement in New York Times v. Sullivan that speech must
be “uninhibited, robust and wide open.”63 Later it also quoted Justice Brandeis’s
equally famous statement in Whitney v. California that “only an emergency justifies
repression.”64 More important, the Supreme Court held that the legal analysis at
hand required balancing. The right to free expression had to be balanced against
the person’s right to dignity and reputation, as well as against the interest of the
public in avoiding a breach of the peace. The tool of “balancing” basic values and
interests was deployed by Justice Brennan in New York Times v. Sullivan and has
influenced American constitutional law since the New Deal. One of its most famous proponents on the US Supreme Court was Justice Felix Frankfurter. Then,
and now, the tool of balancing has been controversial, and lately it has been emphatically rejected by Justice Antonin Scalia but embraced by Justice Anthony
Kennedy.65 In the Senesh case, Chief Justice Barak, true to his jurisprudential philosophy, had taken a stand in favor of balancing and against a formalistic approach
to constitutional law. Today, balancing has permeated Israeli constitutional analysis
so extensively that its roots in American jurisprudence are nearly forgotten.66
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It is interesting, at this point, to reflect on the Senesh case in the company of
Ha’aretz v. Electric Company, decided in the 1970s.67 In Ha’aretz, the Supreme
Court upheld truth as a cherished value, opined that the right to reputation is
as important as the right of the press to criticize public officials, and boldly distanced itself from the American idea that uninhibited speech is good for democracy. The Senesh majority rejected this view, thereby embracing the
American position. But Senesh also included a strong dissent by Justice Mishael
Cheshin. This dissent, along with the fact that public pressure propelled the
Broadcasting Agency to delete the controversial paragraph, may indicate that
underneath the surface there are forces in Israel who feel uncomfortable with
this level of freedom and prefer a higher level of regulation of speech. This discomfort is related not only to matters concerning national security, but also to
matters of history and culture.
As mentioned above, the decision in the Senesh case was delivered in 1999,
thereby symbolically bidding farewell to the twentieth century. That same year,
at the dawn of the new century, Chief Justice Barak delivered another critical
opinion for the Supreme Court, denying the power of Israel’s security services
to engage in torture without explicit Knesset authorization.68 Could he be thinking of the techniques applied against Hannah Senesh, a young woman noble
and pure? At the time, Israel’s battle against terrorism did not touch the American nerve, but soon enough, with the trauma of September 11, 2001, the question of torture came to haunt Americans. They became interested in the Israeli
experience. Herein appears a reverse phenomenon: Israeli influence on American
law. Barak’s opinion has been studied by American legal scholars and judges as
they contemplated an answer to the question of whether the US Constitution
might be interpreted to permit torture.69

The First Decade of the Twenty-First Century
Terrorism continued to be a very serious problem for Israel in the first decade
of the twenty-first century. This review concludes with two cases dealing with
varieties of censorship in the context of the war against terrorism: one decided
in 2003 following Operation Defensive Shield, and the other decided in 2009
as Operation Cast Lead came to an end.
By then, Chief Justice Barak had retired from the bench. His impact on the
legal system of Israel, and in particular on the value of free expression as interpreted in the Israeli context, had been immense. Barak had also kept close ties
with the United States and had been very familiar with its legal system. He was
replaced by Chief Justice Dorit Beinisch. It is interesting to note that while the
Supreme Court of Israel was dominated exclusively by males until 1974, it has
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been much more open to the nomination of women than the US Supreme Court.
Today, in addition to Chief Justice Beinisch, four women serve on the Supreme
Court, compared with the three women now serving on the US Supreme Court.70
The two opinions reviewed below were written by women.
A suicide bomber exploded amid innocent civilians celebrating the Passover
Seder at a hotel in the town of Netanya. Many were killed and more were
wounded. It was one more deadly attack in a string of suicide bombings. In retaliation, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield.71 A particularly fierce
battle ensued in the refugee camp located in the West Bank town of Jenin. Scores
were killed and wounded on both sides, and the destruction was immense. On
the heels of the battle, an Palestinian-Israeli filmmaker, Muhammad Bakri, visited the site with the intent of giving voice to the Palestinian side of the story.
His film, Jenin Jenin, was a blood-chilling “J’accuse” against the Israeli military.72
In accordance with Israeli law (recall that following Laor, discussed above, the
board of censorship of theatrical plays was abolished but the board of film censorship was retained),73 the Board of Film Censorship convened, deliberated,
and banned the film. The film director petitioned the Supreme Court, and the
ban was invalidated. The board argued that the film posed “a danger to the public
peace and its feelings.”74 The main point around which the arguments revolved
was that the film placed Israel and the individual soldiers fighting on its behalf
in an extremely offensive and odious false light, and that it was based not on
facts but on lies and misrepresentations.
The three justices of the panel, Dalia Dorner, Ayala Procaccia, and Asher
Grunis, indeed agreed that the film was offensive and that it did not reflect the
truth. However, they insisted that the board did not have a monopoly on the truth,
and its function is not to shield the Israeli public from falsehoods. Although
the Supreme Court rejected the filmmaker’s argument that the statute authorizing the censorship board was unconstitutional,75 it applied the limitation provision of the Basic Law and found that the ban was not applied for a legitimate
purpose, and furthermore was not proportional.76 The reasoning of the Supreme
Court made it clear that it was well aware of the changes in the media environment in the twenty-first century. It pointed out that the board had no power to
prevent the showing of the film outside of Israel, and that in the age of globalization and the Internet, anyone willing to pay $30 (note that the court used the
currency of the American dollar, not the Israeli shekel) could purchase the film.
The Supreme Court opined that validating the ban might even invite the suspicion that Israel was trying to hide something from international public opinion,
and thus might tarnish Israeli reputation further rather than defending its name.
From the perspective of American influence on Israeli law, this is an interesting
point. Furthermore, the fact that American public opinion is so crucial for
Israel’s well-being appears between the lines. It was the American sweeping
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revolution in technology that turned the world into a global village and made
the film available for all to purchase and watch. American technology thus
made the act of banning futile and even self-defeating.77 From this practical
perspective, it was not even necessary to use American law to reach the result.
American pragmatism was enough.
As we have seen, the Court in Jenin Jenin did not need American law to justify
an antipathy to censorship. It already had its own long line of precedents, starting
with Kol Ha’am, and it had Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom to guide
it in evaluating the legality of governmental action. But the Jenin Jenin Court
did invoke American cases. Justices Holmes and Brandeis’s dissents reappeared,
and their famous quotes were on full display. Justice John Harlan’s seminal opinion in Cohen v. California was also invoked to express “the hope [recall that Israel’s national anthem is “The Hope”] that use of such freedom will ultimately
produce a more capable citizenry and a more perfect polity.”78 But it should be
emphasized that along with the discussion of US law there were also discussions
of English and Australian law.79 This fact displays another difference between
Israeli and American law. In the United States there is currently a raging debate
about the usage of foreign law. Some even argue in favor of amending the Constitution to prohibit the tool of consulting foreign law.80 In this respect, Israelis
are closer to their continental relatives; they are curious and open, willing to
consult any legal solution to the problem at hand.81
Two final anecdotes embedded in the Jenin Jenin opinion help us reflect on
the American/Israeli connection. One of the US Supreme Court justices quoted
by Justice Dorner was Justice William O. Douglas, speaking in 1949 in Terminiello v. Chicago.82 Terminiello, an anti-Semitic priest, vexed the Jewish community in Chicago with his offensive remarks against Jews. On the heels of the
Holocaust, these remarks sparked rage and indignity. The US Supreme Court
invalidated the priest’s conviction for breach of the peace, with Justice Douglas
speaking for the majority. Shortly thereafter, Justice Douglas visited Israel and
met with the justices of the newly established Supreme Court. “Didn’t you go
too far in Terminiello?” asked the Chicagoan Justice Agranat. Justice Douglas
retorted, “We can afford it. Can you?”83 Agranat commented that this answer
reverberated in his mind for many years to come. Almost fifty years later, in
Jenin Jenin the circle was closed. When Justice Dorner was quoting Douglas
in Terminiello, she was also advising that “we can afford it.” Indeed, Israel has
come a long way since its establishment in 1948. Justice Procaccia, the other
woman on the panel, ended her splendid concurring opinion with another
quote, from the most famous legal celebrity in America: Alan Dershowitz. The
Harvard law professor is not only prolific but also extremely influential in both
the United States and Israel. His quote, strategically placed at the end of Procaccia’s opinion, advised, “The solution is to answer bad speech with good
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speech, and to have the good speech prevail in the marketplace of ideas.”84 Dershowitz is one of Israel’s most eloquent and persuasive defenders. Was Justice
Procaccia saying that with friends like these, we do not need censorship? That
his extraordinary advocacy would combat the impact of Jenin Jenin? That here
we have an illustration of what Justice Brandeis meant by saying “more speech”
is the best cure for “noxious doctrine”?
The final case in this review ends the first decade of the twenty-first century:
Society of Foreign Journalists v. Minister of Defense. The journalists, presumably
Americans among them, sought access to the Gaza Strip before, during, and
after Operation Cast Lead. The Supreme Court rejected their petition but expressed satisfaction with the government’s statement that access would be
guaranteed. The opinion was very short and did not rely on any precedents.
No one would have expected a different outcome. One cannot expect the judiciary to interfere in security considerations as war is raging.85 Clearly the
American military would not grant more access to journalists in either Iraq
or Afghanistan. The interesting American fingerprint on the opinion is related
to language. Israelis are proud of their Hebrew. They flag it as one of the most
durable and valuable achievements of Zionism. And yet Hebrew is permeated
with foreign terms. Here Chief Justice Beinisch describes the Supreme Court’s
contribution to the negotiations between the journalists and the military: “We
offered [the government] to consider the ‘pool’ system as a solution to granting
access. . . . The government stated that . . . it will allow the entrance of eight
foreign journalists . . . applying the ‘pool’ system.” Indeed, the word “pool”
appears between quotation marks, as if to indicate that it does not belong. The
chief justice was writing a short opinion spontaneously and in a great hurry,
without taking the time to check whether there was a Hebrew translation for
the term. But she did seem comfortable using American English in her opinion,
while not feeling the need to rely on any American source. This, too, reveals
American influence on Israeli law.86

Conclusion
The second decade of the twenty-first century is barely upon us, and therefore
it is premature to analyze any emerging trends in the field of free expression. It
is, however, important to mention briefly two recent developments. First, the
ubiquitous presence of technology as well as the Internet resulted in what has
come to be known as the Anat Kam affair. Kam, a soldier, surreptitiously obtained classified documents from her military office and shared them with
Ha’aretz reporter Ury Blau. In 2011 Kam was convicted of espionage. It is not
yet clear whether Blau will be indicted for revealing the content of classified
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documents. It remains to be seen whether this episode results in a reaffirmation
of the rationale of the Pentagon Papers case or in a more restrictive jurisprudential approach that insists on the limits of free expression when balanced
against national security concerns.87 American influence may affect the Israeli
courts as they confront this issue, but it is important to realize that in the United
States itself the issue of how to deal with the leakage of classified documents is
extremely controversial.
The second phenomenon that may come to characterize the second decade
of the twenty-first century has a more distinct Israeli flavor. It has to do with a
wave of legislation and legislative activity (bills not passed or bills pending) that
does not directly address freedom of expression yet indirectly chills the freedom
of speech. One example is the Nakba Law, passed in March 2011, which empowers the minister of finance to curb governmental funding of institutions
commemorating the Palestinian trauma rooted in the 1948 war. If this legislative
agenda gains momentum, Israeli democracy may embark on a path more in
keeping with the McCarthy era in the United States and less with the progressive
spirit of the United States, associated with James Madison, Thomas Jefferson,
and Louis Brandeis.88
There is a basic tension within Zionism that nurtures all aspects of Israeli society and culture, including law. It is a tension between Utopian Zionism and
Catastrophe Zionism. In a nutshell, Utopian Zionism reflects the idea of Israel
as a light unto the nations, a state based on universal values and guided by moral
principles, in accordance with the vision of the great biblical prophets of Israel.
This idea is specifically stated in the Israeli Declaration of Independence and
permeates early Zionist thought.89 Judicial opinions invoking the soaring confidence that freedom of speech will lead to better citizenry and a better polity
capture the ideals of Utopian Zionism. Catastrophe Zionism, rooted in the historical experience of persecution, defenselessness, and isolation culminating in
the Holocaust, yield an Israel guided by the particular rather than the universal:
it is a nation dominated by the overwhelming urge to survive, and therefore
subordinates all other considerations to the supremacy of survival. In biblical
terminology, this worldview is captured as “a people that dwells alone and shall
not be reckoned among the nations.”90 Judicial opinions influenced by this vision
emphasize security above other values, aggressively defend the classical Zionist
narrative, and view dissent as disloyal and subversive. Good examples are the
decisions by the censorship boards in Laor and Jenin Jenin versus the Supreme
Court’s opinions in these cases, which agreed that the play and film, respectively,
were offensive, and yet held that they should be protected under Israel’s constitutional umbrella. A similar tension is played out as this chapter is being written,
between those who would like to chill the speech of Israeli professors critical
of Israel, and those who insist that Israel must tolerate and respect their right
to speak.91

Israel and the United States : Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations, edited by Robert O Freedman, Westview Press, 2012.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bu/detail.action?docID=866693.
Created from bu on 2017-12-05 06:24:34.

9780813344942-text_Freedman 1/17/12 9:48 AM Page 209

Chapter 9: American Influence on Israeli Law

209

It is hard to predict how this clash will unfold. As described in this chapter,
Israel has gone a long way toward protecting and tolerating even the most painful
criticism. This trend may well be reversed, however. In making the decision of
whether to maintain the current climate of freedom or to embark on a suppressive path, Israel will not necessarily consult other legal systems. Long are the
days since the leadership of the Yishuv, in the days before statehood, eyed Americans with critical reserve. So, too, gone are the days when American free speech
jurisprudence served as a model for Israelis to look up to and to emulate. By
now Israel is quite mature, and has enough assets in its own library to guide it
through difficult times. American law is still very interesting to Israelis, but it
no longer plays the crucial role it played in the first decades of statehood.
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